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Abstract 
Empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that workers have a strong preference for job security. 
Building on this, the empirical research focused so far on the analysis of the “port-of-entry 
hypothesis” – namely on testing whether temporary jobs may act as a springboard towards 
standard employment relationships – underexploring the issue of what would make workers 
indifferent between the two options. This is the aim of the present paper. Using a dedicated survey 
on a random sample of workers from the Italian public employment service, we find that: i) 
workers actually require a monetary compensation to trade a non-standard job for a standard one; 
ii) moreover, they display lexicographic preferences over contracts, inasmuch as when they have to 
compare an open-ended contract to a freelance contract (chosen as the epitome of precariousness 
in Italy), the compensation they ask for does not depend on contract duration; on the opposite, 
when they compare open-ended jobs to fixed-term jobs (where only expected duration actually 
matters) the required compensation does not depend on the type of contract, but only on its 
planned duration; iii) the estimated MRS between wage and contract duration is 257 more Euros 
per month to accept a one-year shorter employment relationship. 
 
JEL: D03, J33, J41  
Keywords: temporary work, compensation, preferences, marginal rate of substitution 
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1. Introduction 
 Are permanent jobs better than temporary? And, in case, for whom and to what extent? 
These questions enliven a huge political and economics debate since years, especially since the 
share of temporary jobs has started increasing in the last two decades (Neugart and Storrie, 2006 
and Kahn, 2010). The liberalization of temporary contracts has indeed represented the key to 
labor market deregulation in most advanced economies (Berton et al., 2012 and Brandt et al., 
2005) and was originally motivated under the macro argument that excess rigidity prevents the 
efficient (re)allocation of workers on jobs, thus reducing productivity and competitiveness 
(Bentolila and Bertola, 1990, Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993, OECD 1994 and Rogerson, 1987). At 
the micro level, a more flexible labor market is then suggested to increase the workers’ effort 
(Engellandt and Riphanh, 2005), to reduce the duration of unemployment (de Graaf-Zijl et al., 
2011 and Berton and Garibaldi, 2012) and to prevent that the marginal workforce – the youth in 
particular – bears a disproportionate risk of unemployment (Bertola, 1999 and Lazear 1990). The 
recent reforms in Spain (2012) and Italy (2015) – the last chapters in the two countries’ long-
lasting labor market deregulation history – are still understood as necessary steps to recover from 
the Great Recession, and are motivated under the same arguments.  
Labor market deregulation, however, also carries a number of drawbacks at both levels of 
analysis, macro and micro. Just to mention some, temporary workers receive less training in 
general (Bassanini et al., 2007 and Berton and Garibaldi, 2012) and accrue a limited amount of 
specific skills (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999 and Lazear 2009). In addition, workers with short-lived 
employment relationships appear less committed and co-operative to their employers’ business 
goals (Fella, 2004). Both effects may balance out the positive expectations on productivity that we 
have portrayed above, an implication supported by a recent stream of empirical literature 
(Addessi, 2014, Dolado and Stucchi, 2008 and Lucidi and Kleinknecht, 2010). From the individual 
worker’s perspective, labor market deregulation is eventually associated to more job insecurity 
(Heyes, 2011), lower satisfaction and quality of life (Clark, 2001), and poorer pays (Dolado et al., 
2002, European Commission, 2011, Mertens et al., 2007). Undecidedness about the implications 
of labor market deregulation goes hence well beyond the largely debated direct effect on the 
overall level of employment (Bertola, 1990, Boeri, 2010 and Young, 2003).  
In this article, we take the individual worker’s perspective to study empirically the trade-off 
between temporary and open-ended jobs. The discussion above entails that for each individual 
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worker the two types of contract are associated with two different levels of utility (or with the 
same level in case of indifference) and that which of the two is highest (if any) is a priori 
undecided, as workers potentially face cost and benefits in either case. The related theoretical 
literature has proposed some interpretations to such trade-off. Bertola (2004) and Pissarides 
(2001), for instance, suggest that employers and employees may be willing to trade lower wages 
for stricter firing rules and severance payments as a way to reduce the risk of unemployment. 
Berton and Garibaldi (2012), in turn, argue that unemployed workers face a trade-off between the 
ex-ante higher job-finding rate (hence, shorter unemployment duration) that follows from the 
availability of temporary positions, and the ex-post lower risk of unemployment under open-
ended contracts. Which of the two options is actually preferred by the workers is hence an 
empirical matter, with – for once – quite a clear-cut answer: workers prefer open-ended jobs. This 
is not surprising, inasmuch as lower job security associated with temporary contracts is not 
compensated in terms of pay, satisfaction, training opportunities or quality of life, with possibly 
some discussion about more educated workers, which may be more willing to take higher risks in 
order to pursue the type of career they have studied for (Pfeifer, 2008). The huge literature 
studying temporary jobs as springboards to permanent positions (e.g. Autor and Houseman, 2002, 
Berton et al., 2011, Booth et al., 2002, Güell and Petrongolo, 2007 and Magnac, 2000) – and not 
vice versa – further witnesses that the hypothesis that the utility associated to open-ended jobs is 
higher than that resulting from temporary positions is generally taken for granted. 
Casting doubts upon this hypothesis is not among the objectives of the present paper. 
Instead, we aim at measuring the utility gap between temporary and permanent jobs. Under the 
assumption that we can always express utility in monetary terms
2
, if two options provide different 
utilities, there must exist a monetary compensation to convince a non-constrained individual to 
choose the option associated to the lowest utility. In particular, we want to estimate 1) the 
compensation required by a worker to accept temporary jobs of different durations instead of a 
permanent job, and 2) the marginal rate of substitution between the salary and the duration of a 
temporary job. In particular, this last measure assesses the marginal disutility (utility) of one year 
less (more) of security. This is a measure also of the trade-off between the two types of contracts 
and of the value of job security. 
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On top of its academic relevance, the marginal rate of substitution between wage and the 
duration of an employment contract – or, put it differently, the workers’ marginal willingness to 
pay for job security – carries primary policy implications. The fact that a relevant share of the 
employed workforce – 14% in the European Union (Eurostat Data) – holds a temporary contract 
despite this kind of employment relationships carry a strictly lower utility to the workers, 
combined with the evidence that suggests that temporary positions substitute permanent ones 
that would be created anyway, instead of being responsible for a net employment creation (Kahn, 
2010), means that labor demand is rationed. As a consequence, workers do not choose the type of 
contract that maximizes their utility; instead, they are more likely to take the best available option. 
Alonso-Borrego et al. (2005) and Berton and Garibaldi (2012) suggest that workers with poorer 
non-employment options are those who sort into the temporary market. Thus, knowing more 
about the (hidden) subjective price paid by temporary workers represents a necessary step to 
reduce discrimination. This notwithstanding, the available empirical evidence – as discussed later 
in the paper – is extremely poor. This is hardly surprising, as the matter is deeply data driven. 
Estimating how much – in terms of money – workers are willing to trade for more job security, 
requires to observe the job offers among which workers can choose, as well as the chosen 
alternative. This cannot be the case with observational data, where only the chosen option is 
recorded, and is exactly where our contribution improves with respect to the available literature. 
Our research, indeed, relies on a dedicated survey upon a random sample of over 1,500 workers 
from a large Italian province. Interviewed people – on top of answering standard LFS-type 
questions – have been asked to take part into a series of “mental experiments” in which, following 
a conjoint analysis approach, they had to choose among job offers differing by wage and type of 
contract. The resulting information has then been merged to register data from the relevant 
employment offices, granting our results unparalleled internal validity. As far as external validity is 
concerned, then, Italy represents an ideal setting to study the implications of labor market 
deregulation through temporary jobs. Indeed, it ranks second after Ireland in terms of compliance 
to the OECD flexibility agenda (OECD, 1994; 2005) and is the OECD country that deregulated the 
most during the last two decades (Berton et al., 2012). The chosen province – Torino – is then 
representative of an old industrial tradition in transition towards a service-based economy, i.e. of 
an economic environment where labor market rigidity was suggested to stay at roots of growing 
unemployment and falling competitiveness. 
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Our results show that workers actually require a monetary compensation to trade a non-
standard job for a standard one. Moreover, they display lexicographic preferences over contracts, 
inasmuch as when they have to compare an open-ended contract to a freelance contract (chosen 
as the epitome of precariousness in Italy), the compensation they ask for does not depend on 
contract duration; on the opposite, when they compare open-ended jobs to fixed-term jobs 
(where only expected duration actually matters) the required compensation does not depend on 
the type of contract, but only on its planned duration. Eventually, the estimated marginal rate of 
substitution between wage and contract duration is 257 more Euros per month to accept a one-
year shorter employment relationship. 
This paper proceeds as follows: next section deals with the existing literature on temporary 
jobs in order to a) discuss more in details why we expect that temporary jobs reduce workers’ 
individual utility, b) cast our research question into the Italian framework, and c) present the (very 
limited) available results. The following section presents the data, while section four introduces 
the empirical strategy and our model specifications. We then present estimation results. The last 
section draws the main conclusions and set our next research agenda. 
 
2. Related literature 
The literature on temporary jobs is immense. We will therefore provide a review of the 
most relevant contributions, without any pretention of exhaustiveness. In this section we first 
focus on the main negative aspects of temporary jobs individuated by the literature. Then we 
present a more detailed review of studies on the Italian case, and we conclude discussing the (few) 
works that are the most related to ours. The aim is not exhaustiveness, but, rather, to frame and 
to situate our work in the extant literature. As already mentioned in the previous section, job 
security, meant as the stability in time of the job contract is one of the factors that affect job 
satisfaction most (Clark, 2001; Booth et al., 2002; Bender and Heywood, 2006; de Cuyper and de 
Witte, 2007; Bernhard-Oetten et al., 2013).  
People in temporary jobs are associated with higher psychological distress (Bardasi and 
Francesconi, 2004; Gimeno et al., 2004; Virtanen et al., 2005 and De Cuyper and De Witte, 2006), 
more depression (Quesnel-Valléé et al., 2010) and higher mortality rates due to abuse of alcohol 
and use of drugs (Kivimäki et al., 2003) than permanent workers are. In addition, there is evidence 
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of wage discrimination against temporary workers (D’Addio and Rosholm, 2005 and Comi and 
Grasseni, 2012), whose presence in the job market also decreases the job security for permanent 
workers (Koutentakis, 2008). Autor and Houseman (2010) find indeed evidence that, while 
temporary jobs help job placements, some temporary contracts have a negative impact on 
subsequent earnings. Scherer (2009) examines a sample of European workers and finds evidence 
that households with temporary workers are more exposed to problematic “social and family 
situations”
3
 than households with only permanent workers are. This very brief, but dense review 
of the major differences between temporary and permanent jobs suggests that temporary jobs 
likely provide the worker with lesser utility than permanent jobs. This leaves the door open to 
possible economic compensations for the negative aspects of temporary vs permanent jobs.  
A relevant aspect of temporary contracts is their duration: using Italian data, Gagliarducci 
(2005) finds that the probability of moving from a temporary to a permanent job increases with 
the duration of the former. This suggests that each additional year of a temporary contract gives 
the worker a benefit in terms of probability of getting a permanent job, adding non-salary value to 
the “duration component”
4
 of the contract itself. In addition, always using Italian data, Barbieri 
and Sestito (2008) find that experiencing temporary jobs increases the probability of getting a 
“satisfactory job” afterwards. On this basis we expect to find that the wage prize requested by an 
individual decreases with the duration of the temporary job, also given the non-salary benefits 
linked to this characteristic of the contract. Indeed, with specific reference to Italy, previous 
studies suggest that people seem to prefer permanent than temporary jobs for several reasons.  
Samek-Lodovici and Semenza (2008) and Lilla and Staffolani (2009) find that, in Italy, the 
diffusion of temporary jobs has increased income inequality, and are therefore less desirable than 
permanent contracts, especially for young workers and for low-wage profiles (Bosio, 2014). 
Instead, Clementi and Giammatteo (2014) find that atypical jobs in Italy reduce income inequality 
at nationwide level, and suggest that an increase in the number of atypical contracts will further 
decrease this inequality. However, what they do not say is whether this reduction corresponds to 
a downward levelling of salaries or not, and therefore it is not clear if increasing the share of 
atypical contracts would be socially desirable, beyond considerations on inequality. However, 
while holding a temporary job facilitates the transition to permanent employment when 
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 Scherer (2009), p. 527. 
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 Ideally, we can claim that a job contract has different components: wage, duration, type of job, (non-monetary) 
benefits, etc.  
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compared to unemployment (Ichino et al., 2005; Picchio, 2008 and Berton et al., 2011), temporary 
workers seem to have a worse careers than permanent workers (Barbieri and  Scherer, 2009). 
Again, this suggests that temporary contracts are less desirable than permanent, but opens the 
door to a possible assessment of an economic compensation to induce workers to “buy” a 
temporary instead of a permanent contract. In addition, Ponzo (2012) finds that the probability of 
engaging on job-search activity is significantly higher (by 12.3 percentage points) when the target 
is a permanent rather than a temporary contract. Modena et al. (2013) highlight the effect of 
temporary jobs on fertility decisions of the Italian women. They find that temporary female 
workers tend to postpone their first pregnancy, when compared with permanent female workers.  
Several works have chosen Italy to test whether temporary jobs are better or worse than 
permeant. The choice of this country rests on some reasons that we wish to summarise here. Italy 
is a relatively large country, where the labour policy absorbs a large part of the social and political 
debate. Moreover, the job markets of countries like Italy, with historically high levels of 
employment protection and with a Mediterranean welfare state
5
, share several common features. 
Clark and Postel-Vinay (2009) point out that job security is perceived lower in countries with 
stricter employment protection as Italy. In addition, Barbieri (2009) concludes that “atypical jobs 
in Mediterranean labour markets are largely work-insecure positions.”
6
 Kahn (2007) had already 
highlighted that high levels of employment protection (as those present in countries like Italy) 
penalise low-skilled workers with temporary contracts in terms of salary. However, all these 
features are not peculiar of Italy, but are present in several countries with similar welfare systems.  
To our knowledge only Pouliakis and Theodossiou (2010) have already tried to evaluate the 
relative preference for a permanent vs a temporary job in monetary terms. The authors use a 
sample of low-skilled workers from seven European countries to estimate the ex-ante wage 
premium required by them in order to move from a permanent to a temporary job. They base the 
survey used in their paper on questions and vignettes and administered it via the Internet (with 
the exclusion of Greece). The authors estimate that, to accept a transition from a permanent to a 
temporary job, the interviewees require a wage premium of about 15% over their current 
(permanent) wage. Temporary workers evaluate the change less: they require a 5% premium to 
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 On the effects of the institutions on job satisfaction for temporary and permanent workers, see also Pouliakis and 
Theodossiou (2005). 
6
 Barbieri (2009), p. 625. 
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“equalize the value of permanent employment with a temporary job.”
7
 Our work, however, is 
different from Pouliakis and Theodossiou (2010) under several crucial aspects. First, instead of 
conducting Internet “interviews”, our subjects were randomly drawn from the reference 
population, and data was collected through CAT interviews by a specialised centre. This prevents 
self-selections biases with respect to the procedure via the Internet (Bethlehem, 2010). Second, 
while our sample has a more limited geographical reach, it is much more homogeneous, what 
reduces the room for unobserved heterogeneity. Third, the choice set we present to our 
interviewees is smaller and simpler than in Pouliakis and Theodossiou (2010): alternatives are 
described in terms of contract, wage, sector and firm size, but vary only with respect to contract 
and wage, as next section further discusses. While this approach entails a smaller menu of 
potential results than in Pouliakis and Theodossiou (2010), it helps the interviewees to understand 
and disentangle the different options better than when they face more complex choices (Charness 
et al., 2013). Again, this goes in the direction of improving reliability of empirical results. 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
In this paper we use a random sample of the flow of workers who enrolled into a public 
employment service (PES) office of the Italian province of Torino during 2004 at an age between 
15 (the minimum age to get a regular job in Italy) and 29 (the highest age at which a worker can 
sign an apprenticeship contract).
8
 Sampled workers were interviewed in June and July 2006. 
Denials and missing interviewees were replaced in order to preserve sample randomness. At the 
end of the interview process, 1637 valid and complete interviews were collected; after removing 
interviews with missing or inconsistent information, we are left with 1511 observations. Most of 
sampled workers (64%) are women, and the average age at enrolment is 23 – with roughly a third 
of the distribution until the age of 20, and another third from 21 to 25. In terms of educational 
attainment, 40% of our sample has completed compulsory education (lower-secondary 
education), 46% holds a high-school or a vocational diploma, and 13% a tertiary degree. 
 An extremely wide and reliable set of observables identifies our data. Indeed, observables 
include personal information (age, gender and nationality), place of residence (at both enrolment 
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 Pouliakis and Theodossiou (2010), p. 700.  
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 This data was originally collected as a deliverable of the project “Le nuove forme di lavoro in Italia e in Piemonte: 
nuove opportunità o discriminazione?”, funded by CRT Bank Foundation and the Province of Torino, which we thank 
for financial support; a report of the project is available in Berton and Contini (2007). 
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and interview), education, skills (training experiences since enrolment at PES, known foreign 
languages, and computer skills), family background (cohabiting status, number of children, outside 
economic support), employment status (at both enrolment and interview, and including labor 
market participation in pre-enrolment years), availability to take non-standard or inconvenient 
work opportunities (rationalized along eighteen dimensions of analysis), occupation at enrolment 
(ISCO branch, either actual for employed workers or ascribed for unemployed ones), number and 
type of work episodes since enrolment in PES, work satisfaction since enrolment in PES (overall 
and specific for occupation, employment continuity, pay, time schedule, career opportunities, 
skills, capability to combine work and family and social protection) and expectations (same 
dimensions as for satisfaction). What makes our data particularly reliable with respect to other 
survey-based datasets, is that information from interviews was merged with public employment 
service registry files at the individual level. Variables that are common to both sources could be 
cross-checked, and interviews revealing an excess of inconsistencies were disregarded. This, as 
mentioned above, implied disregarding some 8% interviews. In order to prevent the potential for 
attrition bias, stratification weights have been built in order to recover with the main distributions, 
and used in the estimation process. 
Interviewed workers were randomly split into two subsamples. Each worker went through 
a mental experiment in which she was asked to choose between two alternative job offers. 
Workers sorted in subsample S1 (747 observations), could choose between two full-time options 
from the same employer:
9
 a) an open-ended contract with a net wage randomly drawn from a 
uniform distribution with support from 800 to 1,300 EUR per month, and b) a fixed-term direct-
hire contract with (random) duration of one, two or three years and a net wage randomly drawn 
from a uniform distribution with support from 700 to 2,300 EUR per month. The rationale for 
comparing full-time open-ended contracts and full-time fixed-term direct hires is that the two 
work arrangements are statutory equivalent but for their planned duration. In other words, fixed-
term direct hires are in a sense the most protected among temporary work arrangements (Berton 
et al., 2011; 2012). On the other hand, workers sorted in subsample S2 (764 observations) could 
choose between the following full-time options from the same employer: a) an open-ended 
contract with a net wage randomly drawn from a uniform distribution with support from 800 to 
1,300 EUR per month (as for subsample S1), and b) a wage and salary independent contract with 
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 For both subsamples S1 and S2, employer’s type varies across workers but not across alternatives, and includes the 
public sector, a small (5 employees), medium (20 employees) and large (200 employees) firm in the private sector. 
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(random) duration of one, two or three years and a net wage randomly drawn from a uniform 
distribution with support from 700 to 2,600 EUR per month. The rationale for comparing standard 
contracts with independent contracts is instead that this last work arrangement is in Italy 
commonly perceived as the epitome of labor market deregulation. This structure of our mental 
experiment – in which standard contracts are compared to two extremely different non-standard 
alternatives – also allows us to exploit the full sample size of 1,511 observations in a comparison of 
standard contracts with an “average” non-standard one, an opportunity we take advantage of in 
our empirical analysis.
10
 Descriptive statistics suggest that 82% of workers in subsample S1 chose 
the open-ended option – characterized by a mean net wage of EUR 1,051 per month – over the 
fixed-term alternative with a mean net wage of EUR 1,425 and mean duration of two years. 
Analogously, 85% of workers in subsample S2 chose the open-ended option – characterized by an 
average net wage of EUR 1,044 – over the independent contract alternative that displays an 
average wage of EUR 1,530 and a mean duration of about two years. These descriptive results are 
consistent with our initial hypotheses. On the one hand, a clear preference for job security 
emerges; on the other, there exist a monetary price at which workers are available to take the 
non-standard alternative into due consideration. 
 
4. Empirical model and specification issues 
We assume that interviewed workers  get utility  from alternative job offers , and that 
individual utility can be expressed as the sum of some representative utility  which is observed 
by the researcher plus an unobserved component , so that: 
 =  +  
Under very general terms, we also assume that workers choose the most preferred option, i.e. the 
one that gives her the highest utility. The probability of choosing alternative 
 is therefore 
 = Pr >  	∀
 ≠  
= Pr +	 >  +	 	∀
 ≠  
= Pr −  <  − 		∀
 ≠  
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which, further assuming that  is iid extreme value distributed, gives rise to the logit model.
11
 In 
this paper, we model the representative utility  as follows: 
 = (,  , ,  , !, "#$ , %
, &' , %$, ()*) 
where  is linear in the parameters,  includes option- and individual-specific features – namely 
the type of contract, its duration and the wage offered within the mental experiment – and   
represents characteristics of the job offers that do not vary across alternatives but only among 
individuals, what in our case boils down to employer’s type (public or private) and its size (small, 
medium and large in case the job is offered in the private sector). The remaining matrices are 
individual-specific controls: 
-  includes personal information like gender, age, nationality and whether the interviewee 
moved between enrolment in PES and interview. 
-   describes the family background at interview through marital status (single or coupled), 
cohabiting status (alone, with parents, with others) and the number of children. 
- ! describes individual working careers with information on whether the interviewee had 
work experiences before enrolling in PES, employment status at enrolment, the time elapsed 
from enrolment until interview, the share of time spent in unemployment during this time 
frame, the number and type of work episodes. 
- "#$ tries to measure the outside option of the interviewee with respect to the proposed 
choice set within our mental experiment using information on whether she is currently (i.e. at 
the time of interview) receiving economic support from anyone, on whether she has a driving 
license – which captures the size of the labor market actually available to the interviewee
12
 – 
and on an “extended” employment status (employed, unemployed, inactive, at school). 
-  %
 measures skills in terms of occupation (ISCO branch) at enrolment, of training courses 
attended since then, and of the number of software packages, of foreign languages known and 
of educational attainment at interview. 
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 The hypothesis of utility maximization is inconsequential on our empirical analysis, as it is sufficient but not 
necessary to get the logit model, which can be used for “simply describing the relation of explanatory variables to the 
outcome of a choice, without reference to exactly how the choice is made” (Train, 2003, p. 18). Analogously, also the 
hypothesis that the unobserved component of individual utility   is identically and independently distributed across 
individuals does not superimpose any unreasonable structure to the data, as a) the implication of independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is consistent with the imaginary nature of the choice set that workers can choose from, 
and b) given the huge amount of observables, the room for omitted variable bias is extremely limited. 
12
 We had to give up on information on whether the interviewee had a car due to excessive number of missing 
answers. 
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- &'  captures the current availability of workers to accept specific types of employment 
arrangements, and namely night work, shift work, vocational training, fixed-term contracts, 
part-time, seasonal work, causal work, agency contracts, weekend work, independent 
contracts, work from home, self-employment and entrepreneurship; in this perspective, &'  
completes and extends "#$. Moreover, this group of variables further check whether at 
interview the respondent is available to start a new job, is actually looking for a work, and 
whether was available to work in the years before enrolling at PES (December 2002, 2003 and 
2004). 
- %$ captures satisfaction for one’s working career since enrolment into PES; more specifically, 
questions under this section ask interviewees to rate overall and specific aspects of satisfaction 
– including occupation, employment continuity, pay, time schedule, career perspectives, skill 
development, ability to combine work and family life, and social protection – on a 0-10 scale. 
- ()*  mimics %$, for expectations towards career perspectives after the interview date, but 
answers are recorded as “descending”, “stable” and “ascending”. Unfortunately, elements in 
()*  display about 160 missing values, corresponding to interviewees that refused to answer 
about their future expectations. However, since expectations revealed to be a powerful 
explanatory factor of the chosen alternative in our mental experiment, we preferred to further 
reduce the overall sample size and include a measure of expectations in our specifications. 
Given the limited amount of observations with respect to available control variables, we 
had in a sense to save on specifications in order to prevent inefficient and unstable parameter 
estimates. We thus opted for a most preferred specification – our baseline one – and then tried a 
number of different alternatives by changing the specific content of matrices ,, … , ()*.. The 
actual alternative specifications we have tried are described in Table 1. What is relevant to our 
purposes, is that all the estimation results presented in next section revealed robust to the whole 
set of alternative specifications. For this reason, in the remaining of the paper we will comment 
only upon our baseline model.
13
 
The main specification issues, however, concern . The marginal rate of substitution 
(MRS) between two any generic variables )/, and )0, belonging to  is 12%34,35 =
∆34
∆35
=
−70/7/, where 7/ and 70 are the estimated parameters for )/, and )0, respectively. The 
interpretation is straightforward when )/, and )0, are continuous. However, for the sake of 
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realism, while 9: was obviously continuous in our hypothetical job offers, duration could not. 
The reason is that setting a pre-determined duration for an open-ended contract does not make 
sense. The support for the proposed duration of contract is hence discrete with mass points at 
values ,#;<$ ;<, =;	>, $9=	>?, $ℎ	>?.. Our empirical strategy proceeds 
hence in three steps. 
First, we specify  as follows: 
 = A × 9: + 7 × <  (1) 
where < is a dummy taking the value of one if the proposed job offer is under a non-standard 
contract of any duration. With this specification, the ratio −7C/AD is informative on the extra wage 
that our interviewees require to give up on an open-ended job and accept a generic non-standard 
contract. 
Second, we specify  as follows: 
 = A × 9: + 7/ × </, + 70 × <0, + 7E × <E,  (2) 
where <F, are dummies taking the value of one if the proposed job offer is under a non-standard 
contract with duration G where G ∈ ,1, 2, 3.. With this specification, the ratio −7FL/AD is 
informative on the extra wage that our interviewees require to give up on an open-ended job and 
accept a non-standard contract of duration G. 
Third, and last, we further work on the specification of  to exploit the variability in the 
proposed duration of non-standard contracts in order to get a proper estimation of the MRS 
between wage and contract duration. We do this by estimating the following specification for : 
 = A × 9: + 7/ × < + 70 × <0ME, + 7E × <E,  (3) 
where – as before – < takes the value of one if the proposed alternative is a non-standard 
contract of any duration, <E, takes the value of one if the proposed alternative is a non-standard 
contract lasting three years, and – here is the difference with respect to (1) and (2) – <0ME, is a 
dummy signaling non-standard contracts whose duration is two or three years. With model (3), 
the ratio −7/L/AD is informative on the extra wage that our interviewees require to give up on an 
open-ended job and accept a non-standard contract of any duration. Then, the ratio −70L/AD	 
measures the price that a worker is willing to pay to extend the duration of a non-standard 
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contract from one to two years, hence is a true measure of the MRS; analogously, −7EL/AD is an 
estimate of the monthly wage a worker is willing to give up to extend the duration of her contract 
from two to three years. Specifications (3) will be always estimated twice: with unconstrained 
parameters, and forcing 70 = 7E. A likelihood-ratio test accepting the constrained model against 
the unconstrained one would provide evidence in favor of the linearity of MRS between wage and 
duration. This issue is not trivial, as it would make us more confident to extend our results beyond 
the sample space. While this is not really relevant for non-standard contracts with duration longer 
than three years – almost non-existent in Italy and in many countries that took temporary work as 
the main road to labor market deregulation – it turns out to be below the threshold of one year. 
Eventually, it is worth anticipating that each of the three steps described above will be 
applied to the full sample in order to describe the choice between and open-ended job and an 
“average” non-standard contract, by pooling answers by interviews whom were proposed a direct-
hire fixed-term contract as an alternative to an open-ended job, and those who had to compare it 
with an independent contract, possibly the most insecure situation in the reference institutional 
scenario. Then, they will be applied separately to subsamples %/ and  %0. 
 
5. Results 
Table 2 presents the estimation results for model (1). Estimates on the full sample appear 
in the upper panel, while those for subsamples %/ and %0 are displayed in the central and lower 
panels respectively.
14
  Estimates display the expected signs: a higher wage increases the 
probability that the option is taken, while whether the contract is non-standard reduces it. This 
implies that workers require a compensation in order to give up on an open-ended contract and 
accept a temporary one, as expected. When we average over the two types of non-standard 
contracts – namely direct-hire fixed-term (the most protected non-standard option) and 
independent contracts (the least) – this compensation amounts to EUR 1,274 per month, 
significant (upper panel). While at first glance this compensation may appear excessively high – 
interviewees are basically asking to double their wage in order to make them accept a non-
standard job – one has to consider two aspects. First, according to Berton et al. (2009, Table 5.5) 
while young workers with an open-ended contract spend an average of 15.6 months non-
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employed over a period of seven years (hence about 22% of time over the medium run), those 
with non-standard contracts remain non-employed for a cumulative number of months from 22.5 
to 42.0 months (so from 31% to 58% of time). Second, non-standard contracts in Italy are 
associated to poorer social security provisions. For instance, for a given duration of the 
employment relationship, an independent contractor should get an extra pay from 33% to 40% in 
order for her monthly net wage to have the same “economic value” of a standard contract 
(Ibidem, Table 6.2). These two things together explain that a monthly compensation of about EUR 
1,200 is far from being irrational. The lower panels in Table 2 further specify this result. Indeed, 
while workers apparently do not require any compensation to trade an open-ended job for a 
direct-hire fixed-term one (the estimated compensation is indeed positive and equal to EUR 186 
per month, but not statistically different from zero), they ask a very large one to be independent 
contractors (EUR 2,696 per month). Results from model (3) in particular will help us to propose a 
tentative interpretation for this result.  
In addition, all types of contract contain elements of risk and uncertainty. The financial 
stability of the employer, the potential reforms of both the job and the welfare legislations during 
the entire working life, etc. are factors of risk that affect any job. In our specific case, workers are 
able to assess at least two of these risks with some precision: the prospective longer 
unemployment and the lower welfare provisions are evident not only to scholars but also to 
workers and candidates. Assuming that the average individual is risk averse, our estimated 
compensations likely include not only mere equivalent compensations for the expected months of 
unemployment and for the lower welfare provisions, but also some risk premium. This risk 
component is likely to grow as the share of non-standard contracts decreases and vice-versa. The 
reason is that, comparatively with the average social conditions, those of the non-standard 
workers are (and will be) better as their share in the population increases. On the one hand, this 
entails that, if the current diffusion of non-standard contracts spreads, the compensations 
estimated in this paper are likely to decrease. On the other hand, the presence of a risk premium 
renders our estimates even more realistic. 
Table 3 displays estimates of model (2) and distinguishes the non-standard alternatives of 
our mental experiment according to their proposed duration. Results are consistent with 
expectations and with those in Table 2. When fixed-term and independent contracts are pooled 
together (upper panel), the required compensations decreases from EUR 1,409 (1,386) per month 
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to give up on an open-ended job for a one-(two-)year non-standard contract, to a non-significant 
EUR 908 per month when the non-standard alternative lasts three years. The downward sloping 
profile appears reasonable – the longer the non-standard contract, the more similar it gets to a 
standard one – as well as a zero compensation to accept a three-year contract; indeed, during 
those years for young workers in Italy the average ex-post duration of an open-ended employment 
relationship did not exceed two years. Again, all these results are driven by the choice between 
open-ended contracts and independent contracts, as the required compensation for fixed-term 
proposals is not different from zero (mid and lower panels). 
Tables 4 and 5 present results from estimation of model (3), with unconstrained and 
constrained parameters respectively. As for all specifications in Table 1 and for all samples (full, %/ 
and %0) the constrained model is never rejected against the unconstrained one, we focus our 
attention on Table 5.
15
 On average (upper panel) interviewed workers require a compensation of 
EUR 1,395 per month in order to trade an open-ended contract for a non-standard one. Moreover, 
they are willing to pay EUR 292 per month to extend their contract by one year. This is our estimate 
of the marginal rate of substitution between wage and contract duration. Both estimates are 
statistically significant and display the expected signs. The ratio between these two last estimates 
is 4.77; this figure suggests that a non-standard contract with a duration of four years and nine 
months is on average equivalent to an open-ended contract. Data on job tenure in Italy (Venturini 
and Villosio, 2008) show that the average job tenure with the same employer is equal to four years 
and four months. Therefore, our estimated time equivalence of four years and nine months is 
perfectly consistent with the average duration of a tenure. The difference of five months may 
represent the compensation requested by risk averse people.  
Lower panels help us to propose an explanation for puzzling result from models (1) and (2), 
namely that apparently interviewed workers are not worried about trading a standard contract for 
a fixed-term one, and that all the effects are driven by independent contracts. The story is not 
exactly this one. When we focus on fixed-term contracts (mid panel), indeed, results show that 
interviewed workers do not require a compensation for the type of contract (EUR 27 per month, 
not significant) but they do for its duration: namely, they ask for a compensation of EUR 237 per 
month in order to accept one year of reduction in the contract duration. The exact opposite 
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happens for independent contracts. Interviewed workers want a compensation for the type of 
contract (almost EUR 3,000 per month), no matter its duration (EUR 220, not significant). It seems 
then that the story may go as follows. Workers may have a lexicographic ordering of employment 
contracts, according to which they first compare the general statutory framework (entitlement to 
social security provisions, enforceability of collective agreements, obligations and rights towards 
the employer and the like), and only once they deem it sufficiently similar, they take other aspects 
– such as the duration of contract – into account. In this perspective, standard and direct-hire 
fixed-term contracts are statutory equivalent, but for the fact that the latter entails a 
predetermined duration of the employment relationship. It is hence perfectly reasonable that 
workers do not require any compensation for the type of contract, but only for its potentially 
lower duration. On the contrary, open-ended and independent contracts pertain to two extremely 
different institutional realms. Dependent work, with full eligibility to social protection schemes 
(unemployment, sickness and maternity allowances just to mention some) and full coverage of 
collective agreements for the former; independent work, with almost no access to social 
protection and no coverage from collective agreements for the latter (see Berton et al., 2012 for a 
detailed comparison). In this situation, workers simply do not go beyond the “first-order” 
difference between the two contracts, and ask for a compensation simply to give up on the most 
protective institutional framework. The actual contract duration appears as a second-order 
problem. We are now in a position to draw some concluding remarks. 
 
6. Concluding remarks and research agenda 
In this paper we took advantage of a dedicated survey on a random sample of workers 
from the registry of the public employment service of a large northern Italian province in order to 
study the subjective monetary value that workers give to employment protection. More in 
particular, we aimed at estimating the marginal rate of substitution between wage and the 
(expected) duration of an employment relationship. Our analysis drives us to three main 
conclusions. 
First, while the average price required by workers to give up on an open-ended job and 
accept a temporary arrangement of any duration – around EUR 1,300 per month, which is 
tantamount doubling one’s wage – may appear at first glance too much, it sounds more 
reasonable once one considers that non-standard jobs in Italy imply staying unemployed longer in 
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the medium run – even three times as much – with a poorer (if not neglected) access to social 
protection schemes. This in turn implies that a) even if workers probably do not know precisely 
about the local labor market dynamics and the institutional details of the job offers they receive 
(the rate of social security contribution to pay, the eligibility conditions to the unemployment 
benefit, and the like), they have roughly a correct idea of the monetary implications; moreover, b) 
this is also a signal that interviewees took the conjoint analysis this paper is based on sufficiently 
seriously. 
Second, interviewed workers trade a one-year shorter employment relationship for an 
extra wage of about EUR 300 per month. This marginal rate of substitution between wage and the 
expected duration of an employment relationship – or, put it differently, the marginal willingness 
to pay to enjoy a more stable career – is linear in the space of durations which are most relevant 
for young workers (1-3 years). 
Third, the estimated effect on the trade-off among the types of contract (standard vs. non-
standard, irrespective of duration of the latter) is driven by the choice between open-ended and 
independent contracts, the epitome of precarious employment in the Italian institutional setting. 
On the contrary, the estimated effect on the trade-off between duration and wage, is driven by 
direct-hire fixed-term contracts, which are institutionally equivalent to standard contracts but for 
the fact that they have a predetermined duration. This is consistent with workers having a 
lexicographic preference among employment contracts. In other words, it seems that workers 
rank contracts according to their general institutional set-up, and only once the set-up is deemed 
sufficiently similar, they take “second-order” aspects, like duration, into account. 
These results are particularly relevant for at least two reasons. On the one hand, we have 
estimated a value for the disutility associated to atypical and fixed-term contracts. On the other 
hand, we have shown that workers are potentially willing to accept these contracts, if they are 
compensated for the different levels of social protection and security. This entails that 
governments and employers can achieve the transition towards a more flexible labour market at a 
cost (whose magnitude is estimated in our paper). Whether they are willing to pay this cost 
depends on the balance between it and the benefits, what requires a general-equilibrium analysis 
which is beyond the scope of our work.  
An additional comment relates to what the economics literature calls “endowment effect”. 
In fact, Italian workers have enjoyed high levels of social security for decades; workers (and new 
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entrants in the labour market) may consider these levels of social security as intrinsic parts of the 
labour contract, as a sort of psychological contract (Guest, 1998 and Willems et al., 2006). Now, in 
such a case, as the literature shows (Kahneman et al, 1991; Franciosi et al., 1996 and Morewedge 
et al., 2009), the compensation requested by a person for something which belongs to his/her 
endowment is larger than the amount of money required for something that is not in the person’s 
possession. According with this reading, the compensations required by the interviewees may be 
larger than the amount requested by future workers, once people will no longer perceive the 
current levels of social protection as parts of the labour contract. In such a case, the additional 
costs related by the compensations could decrease with time.   
Our next research aims at starting from these results to study what is the role of risk 
aversion within this story. In order to do this, we aim at merging our data to registry information 
from the social security archives. This puts us in a condition to know what the actual career of our 
interviewees’ pairs looked like during the years under scrutiny, and hence to build a monetary 
measure of the actual loss of being a non-standard rather than a standard worker. We will 
interpret the difference between required compensation and actual loss in terms of risk price, a 
further reason why workers may require a compensation for less job protection. 
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Tables 
Table 1: baseline and alternative specifications 
 BL 
Robustness checks 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Peri 
Female X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Age at interview X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Age at interview, squared  X               
Foreigner   X              
Mover    X             
Fami 
Single at interview      X           
Living with parents at interview                 
Living with others at interview                 
Living alone at interview X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Number of children at interview     X            
Has children at interview X X X X  X X X X X X X X X X X 
Cari 
Months since enrolment in PES       X          
Had work experience at enrol.       X          
Employed at enrolment       X          
Unemployed at enrolment       X          
Not in labor force at enrolment       X          
% time in unemployment        X          
Work episodes since enrolment        X         
Had no work episodes         X        
Had 1 work episode         X        
Had 2 or more work episodes         X        
Long work episodes (> 1 month)        X         
Had no long work episodes         X        
Had 1 long work episode         X        
Had 2 long work episodes         X        
Had 3 or more long work epis.         X        
Only dependent work episodes X X X X X X    X X X X X X X 
From dependent work to other X X X X X X    X X X X X X X 
From other to dependent work X X X X X X    X X X X X X X 
Work episodes without contract X X X X X X    X X X X X X X 
Only independent contracts X X X X X X    X X X X X X X 
Other types of work episodes X X X X X X    X X X X X X X 
No work episodes X X X X X X    X X X X X X X 
Outi 
Receiving economic support X X X X X X X X X  X X X X X X 
At school / studying at interv.          X       
Unemployed at interview          X       
Employed at interview          X       
Inactive at interview          X       
Has driving license at interview X X X X X X X X X  X X X X X X 
Skii 
Compulsory education at int. X X X X X X X X X X   X X X X 
Vocational education at int. X X X X X X X X X X   X X X X 
Upper secondary school at int. X X X X X X X X X X   X X X X 
Tertiary education at int. X X X X X X X X X X   X X X X 
Took part in training since 
enrol. 
          X      
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Number of foreign languages           X      
 B
L 
Robustness checks 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Number of training since enrol.           X      
Number of software since 
enrol. 
          X      
ISCO Branch 1 at enrolment            X     
ISCO Branch 2 at enrolment            X     
ISCO Branch 3 at enrolment            X     
ISCO Branch 4 at enrolment            X     
ISCO Branch 5 at enrolment            X     
ISCO Branch 6 at enrolment            X     
ISCO Branch 7 at enrolment            X     
ISCO Branch 8 at enrolment            X     
Avai (dummy variables) 
Looking for a job at interview X X X X X X X X X X X X   X X 
Available for a job at interview X X X X X X X X X X X X X  X X 
Available at December 2002             X    
Available at December 2003             X    
Available at December 2004             X    
Night work              
S
u
m
 o
f a
ll d
u
m
m
ie
s a
s o
v
e
ra
ll m
e
a
su
re
 
  
Shift work                
Vocational training contracts                
Open-ended contracts                
Fixed-term contracts                
Full-time work                
Part-time work                
Seasonal work                
Occasional work                
Agency work                
Weekend work                
Independent contracts                
Work from home                
Stage / internship                
Self-employment                
Entrepreneurial activity                
Training (without working)                
Sati (rated 0-10) 
Overall satisfaction since enrol. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  X 
For occupation               
M
e
a
n
 ra
tin
g
 
 
For employment continuity                
For pay                
For time schedule                
For career perspectives                
For skill development                
For family/work combination                
For social protection                
Expi (rated -1 = descending, 0 = stable, +1 = ascending) 
For occupation 
S
u
m
 o
f v
a
lu
e
s 
S
u
m
 o
f v
a
lu
e
s 
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m
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f v
a
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s 
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s 
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S
u
m
 o
f v
a
lu
e
s 
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For employment continuity X 
For pay X 
For time schedule  
For career perspectives  
For skill development  
For family/work combination  
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Table 2: parameter estimates, specification (1) 
Variable 
Coefficient 
Interviewees 
−NO/PQ 
Estimate Robust SE P-value Estimate P-value 
Full sample 
dij -1.5062* 0.80446 0.061 
1,349 1274* 0.079 
Wageij 0.0012*** 0.00026 0.000 
Subsample S1: open-ended vs. direct-hire fixed-term 
dij -0.2270 1.07244 0.832 
738 186 0.830 
Wageij 0.0012*** 0.00043 0.004 
Subsample S2: open-ended vs. independent contracts 
dij -3.5666*** 1.13739 0.002 
691 2696** 0.022 
Wageij 0.0013*** 0.00037 0.000 
Source: own estimations on PES data. 
 
 
Table 3: parameter estimates, specification (2) 
Variable 
Coefficient 
Interviewees 
−NO/PQ 
Estimate Robust SE P-value Estimate P-value 
Full sample 
d1,ij -1.6835** 0.82211 0.041 
1,349 
1409* 0.055 
d2,ij -1.6562** 0.81392 0.042 1386* 0.057 
d3,ij -1.0847 0.77586 0.162 908 0.176 
Wageij 0.0012*** 0.00026 0.000 - 
Subsample S1: open-ended vs. direct-hire fixed-term 
d1,ij 0.2879 1.17947 0.807 
658 
-197 0.8094 
d2,ij 0.5334 1.13873 0.639 -366 0.6510 
d3,ij 1.2309 1.13450 0.278 -844 0.3262 
Wageij 0.0015*** 0.00048 0.003 - 
Subsample S2: open-ended vs. independent contracts 
d1,ij -3.6903*** 1.16350 0.002 
691 
2759** 0.017 
d2,ij -3.8525*** 1.18061 0.001 2880** 0.017 
d3,ij -3.2738*** 1.06139 0.002 2448** 0.020 
Wageij 0.0013*** 0.00036 0.000 - 
Source: own estimations on PES data. 
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Table 4: parameter estimates, specification (3), unconstrained 
Variable 
Coefficient 
Interviewees 
−NO/PQ 
Estimate SE P-value Estimate P-value 
Full sample 
d1,ij -1.4477** 0.70537 0.040 
1349 
1272** 0.048 
d2-3,ij 0.1271 0.19688 0.519 -112 0.525 
d3,ij 0.4946** 0.17484 0.005 -435** 0.014 
Wageij 0.0011*** 0.00025 0.000 - 
Subsample S1: open-ended vs. direct-hire fixed-term 
d1,ij 0.2016 1.01536 0.843 
658 
-131 0.844 
d2-3,ij 0.1784 0.28763 0.535 -116 0.542 
d3,ij 0.5662** 0.24709 0.022 -367* 0.053 
Wageij 0.0015*** 0.00045 0.001 - 
Subsample S2: open-ended vs. independent contracts 
d1,ij -3.6424*** 1.06604 0.001 
691 
2893*** 0.006 
d2-3,ij 0.1147 0.28331 0.685 -91 0.690 
d3,ij 0.4135 0.26356 0.117 -328 0.136 
Wageij 0.0013*** 0.00034 0.000 - 
Source: own estimations on PES data. 
 
 
Table 5: parameter estimates, specification (3), constrained 
Variable 
Coefficient 
Interviewees 
−NO/PQ 
Estimate SE P-value Estimate P-value 
Full sample 
d1,ij -1.5669** 0.69915 0.025 
1349 
1395** 0.032 
d2-3,ij = d3,ij 0.3282*** 0.10766 0.002 -292** 0.011 
Wageij 0.0011*** 0.00025 0.000 - 
Subsample S1: open-ended vs. direct-hire fixed-term 
d1,ij 0.0415 0.99988 0.967 
658 
-27 0.967 
d2-3,ij = d3,ij 0.3955*** 0.15328 0.010 -257** 0.037 
Wageij 0.0015*** 0.00045 0.001 - 
Subsample S2: open-ended vs. independent contracts 
d1,ij -3.6871*** 1.06430 0.001 
691 
2976** 0.005 
d2-3,ij = d3,ij 0.2726* 0.15784 0.084 -220 0.117 
Wageij 0.0012*** 0.00033 0.000 - 
Source: own estimations on PES data. 
 
